

Militancy and the Amnesty Program in Niger Delta Region of Nigeria; 2005-2014

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ABSTRACT

The clamour for resource control by the Niger Delta region has become one of the contentious issues in Nigeria. The desire to address the structural deficiency gave birth to militancy. The study examines the activities of militant, and amnesty programme within the context of understanding justice and equity in the Niger Delta Region of the country. The study employs the use of content analysis to carry out the task which relies only on the use of secondary data collection. The paper argued that amnesty package have focused almost entirely on military and security objective as expressed in the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes. The study revealed national loss of income and resources; security challenges; downsizing of oil companies' employees; dwindling foreign direct investment; and destruction of national unity among others as implications of the militancy in the region. The paper concluded by recommending more proactive response to the crisis in the region, an all-encompassing approach, an articulated regulatory framework acceptable to all stakeholders, for there to exist a modicum of Niger Delta security, and by extension, a secured federation.

Keywords: Militancy, Amnesty and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

Introduction

Niger Delta of Nigeria has drawn both local and international attention, been the epicentre of ceaseless struggle. The region's abundant natural resources offer a potential foundation for development and prosperity, contrariwise this did not manifest in the region as it exemplifies the image of poverty in the midst of plenty, what an irony? The rates of unemployment and under-employment is high couple with infrastructural deficit.

In 1956, Nigeria operated a loose fiscal federalism with powerful regions enjoying autonomy in the production of their wealth. However, the expectations of greater resource control were frustrated, as the federal military government transferred the control of oil resources to itself through legislation (Obi, 2005). The 1969 Petroleum Decree gave the federal government ownership and control of all petroleum resources in the country. The 1978 Land Use Decree also nationalized

all land under the administration of state and local governments. The development has heightened ethno-regional competition and marginalisation in the multi-ethnic Niger Delta and across Nigeria (Collier and Sambanis, 2005).

Suffice to say that it was not the discovery of oil that ignited crisis in the Niger Delta, but rather, the negative effects of oil exploitation, marginalisation and militarize response approach to the demand of the people of the region by federal government. On a good note, it is expressed that the crisis in the Niger Delta is not complex by itself, rather the military approach to resolving the crisis has been complex and dangerous. This civil protest movement metamorphosed into outright militancy with the belief that power flows from the barrel of the guns. Militancy became justified by its protagonists on the failure of non-violent actions adopted earlier by youths in the region.

Beginning in late 2005 and until Amnesty was offered to freedom fighters in mid-2009, escalating unrest led to significant losses in production (Francis, Lapin and Rossiaasco 2011). The realization by government that militarization can be counter-productive led former Late President Yar'Adua to offer amnesty to all combatants who agreed to disarm within the stipulated period of time (Oyadongha, 2006) cited in Dike (2007). Consequently, after the post amnesty period, the Niger Delta appeared rather peaceful as there was relative peace in the oil rich region (Aghedo, 2013).

Statements of the Problem

The Nigerian economy was dependent on agriculture and exploitation of non-renewable natural resources until the discovery of crude oil in 1957 and subsequent oil boom in the 1970s which eventually led to gradual decline in agricultural production. Today, Nigeria depends solely on oil revenue to carry out the task of governance. Incidentally, oil wealth enriches Nigeria, but it has not alleviate the suffering in the oil producing region. This paradox and apparent tragedy of poverty in the midst of wealth of the region.

In reactions to the attitude of government to the agitation of resource control which is a result of absolute neglect, marginalization and mismanagement on the side of successive administration; a number of

militant insurgency was formed to address the issues in their own way thereby employed violent approach which has really affect the social-economic situation of the federation. The introduction of amnesty was therefore a response to the Niger Delta agitation turned crisis with the intention of granting unconditional amnesty to the militants which will in turn stop the ranging restiveness, and finally return peace to the oil rich region.

Objective

The main objective of the study is to appraise the Federal Government amnesty program in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.

Conceptual Clarification

The word amnesty is a Greek word derived from “amnestia” which is an act of grace by which the supreme power in a state restores those who may have been guilty of any offence against it to the position of innocent persons and obliterates all legal remembrances of the offences. It is also the act of authority by government in which pardon is granted to persons especially for political offences, and release from guilt or penalty of an offence (Ikelegbe and Umokoro 2014). It is a guarantee of exemption from persecution and pardon from punishment for certain criminal, rebel and insurgent actions hitherto committed against the state (Ikelegbe, 2010).

It is an agreement between the government and the criminal who are willing to surrender their arms or preferably stop fighting while government will be ready to play the role of father by welcoming them like the biblical prodigal son. Government demonstrates total forgiveness and as well provide means of living for the former offender so as not to go back to their former criminal life, but become dedicated citizens and law abiding one.

The program of amnesty inculcates Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). Fusato (2003) argues that the three phases of DDR are interconnected, and the successful completion of each phase is essential to the success of the others. The immediate short-term goal is the restoration of security and stability, through the disarmament of warring parties. The objective of the DDR process is to contribute to stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin. DDR is a central component of transitions from war to peace and occurs within a framework of reconciliation and peace building as well as conflict terminating negotiations and agreements.

It is a very complex, delicate, sensitive and difficult process that requires extensive planning and preparations, pragmatism, funds and technical support (Lawrence and Shie 2003). As Ikelegbe (2010) has noted, DDR success depends on the competence of

management, the neutrality and impartiality of the entire process, the level of trust, confidence, integrity and transparency that the process generates and the careful and comprehensive planning that go into the process. The phases of DDR are overlapping, cross-cutting and interdependent. While disarmament controls the physical tools of violence, demobilization and reintegration controls the human tools of violence.

Disarmament and demobilization are part of military process while reintegration is a civilian process (Dzinesa 2007). Overall success is dependent on the success of each phase. Disarmament without planned economic and social reintegration, and demobilization without previous disarmament are efforts in futility (Fusato 2003). Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of weapons from combatants (Egbeme, 2015). It is the drastic reduction or elimination of all weapons looking towards the eradication of war itself based on the notion that “if there are no weapons there would be no war”. Disarmament is essentially a military operation, designed to manage the instruments of violence (weapons) such that a secure and stable environment can be created for post conflict transition and implementation of peace agreements.

Demobilization is the drawdown of combatants out of the military structures of wartime military forces as the nation resumes peacetime status. It involves the immediate or first step of transition from combat life to civilian life. Demobilization is a risky and uncertain activity that can be bedeviled with treachery and breakdown. The focus is on reduction of the military forces to more manageable size, particularly after a war. Reintegration can be defined as the restoration to a condition of integration or unity. It is the return of disarmed soldier after an armed conflict has come to an end. It is helping combatants to integrate into society.

The Militias and Militancy in the Niger Delta

There have been three clear periods in the militia and militancy phenomenon in the region, apart from the AdakaBoro’s Niger Delta Volunteer Force’s insurgency in 1966.

Phase One

It was the initial nurturing of militancy between 1998 and 2000. It emerged from a radical and militant youth movement which began to challenge marginalization, neglect, environmental devastation, and marginality by the oil companies and the Nigerian state. The first of such was the Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities. They were hurriedly formed and equipped in response to the militarization approach of federal government. They commenced operation climate change within the Kaiama Declaration which grew rapidly across the region. The groups included the Egbesu Boys of Africa

and the Movement for the Survival of Ijaw Ethnic Nationality (MOSIEN).

Phase Two

There was interregnum of the activities of militias between 2001 and 2003. Phase two came on board after the general election of 2003 which was militarized. The recruited armed youth, thugs, gangs and cult groups assigned to intimidate opponents in attempt to rig elections formed the new generation of militia groups after the said deadly assignment came to end. Two prominent groups that emerged are the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and the Niger Delta Vigilantes (NDV) led by Mr Asari Dokubo and Mr Tom Ateke respectively. The NDPVF started their insurgent activities from the creeks and major on oil facilities attack, production disruptions and confrontations with the military until its leader was arrested and detained by River state government due to disagreement between the duos in 2005. The arrest significantly sparked the militia activities and militancy. The activities was heightened by NDPVF and other militia groups to demand for Dokubo release. (Onuoha, 2010). Dokubo arrest consequently play role in the proliferation of militant groups in the Niger Delta.

Phase Three

This emerged through coalitions, movements and joint action groups of arrow heads of militias who provide joint commands among the proliferated groups. The most prominent among these apex groups were the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Coalition for Militant Actions in the Niger Delta (COMA) and Martyrs Brigade (MB), NDPVF, MEND, and MB constituted the Joint Revolutionary Council (JRC) at a point in history. The phase was the most armed, sophisticated, tactically mobilized, and bold militias. It is also the most organized, coordinated, sustained and effective militia groups in the Niger Delta. MEND, COMA and JRC latter became the renowned militia groups that eventually coordinated and gave a leadership direction to other numerous militia groups and fighting forces. They served as agents and guards to oil bunkering and its syndicates. They also controlled territories where bunkering is done thereby collecting commissions from bunkers and from the TNOCs. They associated with illegal local refineries which have provided huge funds for arms and support for community development, as well as with the politicians and government houses (Adeyemi-Suenu, 2010). They took militia operations to its highest levels concurrently attacking on military formations and large oil on shore and off shore facilities.

Perceptions of the Niger Delta Militias

Two schools of thoughts emerged due to different experience of the phenomenon of militias in the Niger Delta region. The first school of thought sees militias as

agitators who took up arms against the objects of their misfortune. The aim of the group is to seek development and economic empowerment of the people. They regarded as freedom fighters and patriots. They are clans and community based militias and warlord militias that are centred on founding commanders. They are broader based, pan ethnic and pan regional militia groups and apex coordinating and command militias. They utilized strategies of production sabotage, bombing, vandalization of oil facilities, kidnapping, road side bombing, speed boat coastal raids, hit and run attack on military and police facilities and formations

The second school of thought sees militias as bunch of miscreants, deviants and criminals who engaged in criminality under the camouflage of the patriot. Arising from the huge resources from oil bunkering other activities; wealthy and influential people most especially politicians and government officials financed numerous militia groups and make huge income, and thereby became largely criminalized with opportunistic driven by selfish interests.

Fundamental Causes of Militant Insurgency in Niger Delta

There has been a high rate of militancy and insecurity in the Niger Delta starting from 2006. This revolves around some salient fundamental issues, which include but not limited to:

Legislations of Disempowerment and Subjugation: The promulgation of some questionable legislations, which were specifically used for the disempowerment and exploitation of the Niger Deltans by federal government is one the reasons for restiveness in the region. Some relevant examples of this obnoxious law include Decree No. 51 of 1969 which gave the ownership and total control of petroleum products in the country to the Federal government of Nigeria and the Land Use Decree of 1978, which also vested land ownership in Nigeria in the Federal government.

Politics of Marginalization and Exclusion: Alarmingly, despite the fact that the Niger Delta region accounts for over ninety percent of the country's export earnings, forty percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and at least eighty percent of her annual income, there has been a conscious and deliberate policy geared towards the marginalization and sidelining of vital issues affecting the region; their exclusion from the enjoyment of the oil proceeds and the virtual prohibition from assuming key leadership position in Nigerian state ensure and gave birth to restiveness.

Pervasive Poverty and Underdevelopment: The use of detestable legal instruments of subjugation and domination, and the intentional marginalization, denial and exclusion of the Niger Delta cumulatively inevitably gave birth to the monumental poverty and

underdevelopment witnessed in the region despite the substantial contribution of the Delta region to the socio-economic development of Nigeria.

The Distribution of Resources from the Federation Account: This has been another source of marginalization for the Niger-Delta region. Prior to 1999, the allocation to the Niger Delta from the federation account from oil gradually decreased as Nigeria became more dependent on oil. In 1960, the allocation was 50%, down to 45% in 1970, declining to 20% in 1982, diminish to 3% in 1992. The principle of derivation, which was hitherto based on fifty percent resource allocation to region was abrogated; while new quota suddenly sprang up as the bases for the allocation of resources to both the federal and states. This was apparently to the detriment of the socio-economic development of the region and its people. It was only after several years of peaceful and violent protests by Niger Deltans, that it was raised to the 13% derivation, which was enshrined in the 1999 constitution (Ikelegbe, 2006).

Unemployment: Unemployment coupled with underemployment is very high among the people of the Niger-Delta. The youths from the Niger Delta do not benefit from the presence of the oil transnational corporations operating in their communities. "Less than 5% of the people workers work in the companies are from the Niger-Delta, while women from the region working with the oil companies are less than 1% (Ejibunu, 2007).

Divide-and-Rule Policy: The oil-producing companies operating in the Niger-Delta in collaboration with federal government have adopted a divide-and-rule strategy in which people is identified for compensation in the host communities. They use this to influence the indigenes to ensure peaceful environment to operate in at minimal cost. Money that supposed to spend on the development of the host communities are paid to such selected individuals and groups. This has become good business for the militias as they occasionally cause problem when in need of money. (Ikelegbe, 2006).

Pre-Amnesty Crude Oil Production in Nigeria

In late 2005, militancy in the Niger Delta worsened with frequent attacks on oil installations and the taking of hostages (Watts, 2007). Toward ending of 2006, the attacks degenerated to the use of electronically detonated car bombings, attack on government building metamorphosis into massive disruption of oil installations, deploying of sophisticated weapons and the kidnapping of oil workers. The table below showed the statistics of effects of militias attack:

Table 1: Incidence of Pipeline Vandalism 2001-2008

Year	No. of Cases	Amount lost (N) billion
2001	984	1021
2002	461	3.867
2003	516	7.971

2004	779	12.986
2005	895	19.66
2006	2237	42.102
2007	3674	36.646
2008	3224	17.24

Source: Punch, 2008 cited in Asua (2013)

Following the incidence of pipeline vandalism (as shown in Table 1) and deterioration of insecurity in the Niger Delta region, many oil companies withdrew their personnel and this led to drastic decrease of oil production (NNPC, 2009). Tanimu (2009) noted that immediately after election, violence in the Niger Delta region dropped Nigeria's crude oil output by nearly 1 million barrel per day, plunging production to its lowest level since 2003. The Technical Committee of Niger Delta (TCND) report (2009) as cited in Asua (2013) reported that the average of 700,000 barrel of oil was lost per day.

The department of petroleum resources claimed that oil losses on account of militancy amounted to over \$1 billion annually. The figure represent 32% of the revenue the country generated that year (NNPC, 2009). In 2006, MEND claimed to have achieved a goal of cutting Nigerian output by 30% and has apparently succeeded (Watts, 2007). TCND as shown in table 2 below, reported that country lost about N8.84 trillion (\$66,746,526,000 billion) to oil vandalism and sabotage in the volatile region between 2006 and 2008.

Table 2: Loss of Revenue due to Militants Activities from 2006-2008

Year	Amount lost in US Dollars (\$)
2006	27,220,320,000
2007	18,805,362,000
2008	20,270,842,000
Grand Total	66,746,526,000

Source: TCND Quarterly Report 2009) cited in Asua (2013)

At the height of the volatility in the Niger Delta as shown in Table 2, the total cost of crude oil production dropped due to the activities of the militant. In 2006, it was estimated at N2.454 trillion or \$27.2 billion. In 2007, the drop in crude oil production was estimated at N2.69 trillion or \$18.8 billion. In 2008, the drop was estimated at N2.97 trillion or \$20.2 billion (TCND Report, 2009) cited in Asua (2013). The table below presents a summary of oil production in Nigeria between 2003 and 2008:

Table 3: Crude Oil Production in Nigeria, from 2003-2008

Year	Production	Change
2003	2,275.00	7.42%
2004	2,328.96	2.37%
2005	2,627.44	12.82%
2006	2,439.86	-7.14%
2007	2,349.64	-3.70%
2008	2,165.44	-7.84%

Source: Energy Information Administration, (EIA), www.eia.doe.gov.

Amnesty and Crude Oil Production in Nigeria

Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa and the eleventh largest in the world, which frequently exceeded its production quota at 2,265,000 bpd

compared 2,220,000 bpd as at September 2004 (NNPC, 2009). However, the simultaneous growth of militancy and oil disruption compromised oil production such that, oil production dropped by no fewer than 750,000 barrels per day (Watts, 2007). With the lingering violent conflict over the ownership and control of oil resources and series of attacks on oil infrastructure by militants, it became glaring to the government that militants are wreaking havoc on economy as evidenced in oil production drastic reduction.

To save the scenario, the Federal Government decided to change the strategy by embarking on a nonviolent confrontation and offered an unconditional amnesty package to the militants as a road map to ending the injustice and inequality so that there would be peace and sustainable development in the region. The proclamation of the amnesty was welcomed by a large segment of the people, groups, and the international community and pledges their support for the programme. The amnesty package gave ex-militants the ample opportunity to surrender their arms and ammunitions, and willingly sign the amnesty pact. President Musa Yar'Adua in his statement put the amnesty declaration thus:

The offer of amnesty is predicated on the willingness and readiness of the militants to give up all illegal arms in their possession, completely renounce militancy in all its ramifications unconditionally, and depose to an undertaking to this effect. It is my fervent hope that all militants in the Niger Delta will take advantage of this amnesty and come out to join in the quest for the transformation of our dear nation, (Aghedo, 2013).

In reaction to the amnesty proclamation, Ajumobi questioned the code and principle guiding the FG amnesty deal when he stated thus as cited by Adeyemo and Olu- Adeyemi (2010):

“Political amnesty is usually a product of two contexts. The first is a negotiated settlement in which two warring parties have arrived at a dead-end in their conflict, and decide to settle their difference politically. The second contexts is one of a victor’s amnesty in which a party overwhelm the other, claims victory and decided to be magnanimous in victory by offering amnesty to some or all of the combatants on the defeated side”.

In line with this statement, Adeyemo and Olu-Adeyemi (2010) further expressed concern that:

“There is neither a negotiate settlement in the Niger Delta or a victor’s benevolence of any kind. There is no peace truce and the Federal Government has not won the military battle in the creeks in spite of its heavy artillery and weaponry. Why then offer amnesty in a vacuum?”

Judging from above reaction, it is obvious that the Federal Government amnesty programme was indeed faulty and does not constitute amnesty as the basic

condition of amnesty have not been met for the simple reasons of not resolving the root causes of the Niger Delta crises and has not interact with those whose interest have been affected in the violent conflicts and reaching a political settlement. The exclusion of MEND from the amnesty deal coupled with the increasing number of acclaimed militants attacking oil facilities after the deadline of the amnesty shows that it was virtually a vacuum amnesty.

There was no peace deal or formal agreement between the FG and the people of the community on one hand and between the ex-militants on the other hand. The development that led to amnesty was a mere consultations with the governors, regional and traditional leaders. The manner in which the amnesty was offered carried the semblance of a threat to militants to surrender their arms and ammunition by imposing a deadline on them without really winning and convincing their minds.

Post-Amnesty Crude Oil Production in Nigeria

Considering the number of militants that turned in their weapons, it is no accident that the government considers the amnesty programme through disarmament a huge success. The upper chamber of the parliament passed a resolution commending the success of the amnesty deal as observed:

“the disarmament of the militants has yielded positive result for the government of Nigeria, the participation of the militants in the amnesty offer is producing some benefits for Nigerian government, the increase in oil and gas production as against the sharp decrease witnessed in the first quarter of 2009” (Guardian, December, 2009).

Ekwuruke (2009) cited in Asua (2013) emphasizing on the outcome of the benefits of the amnesty programme through disarmament of the militants as he claimed that Nigeria can once again fill its OPEC quota and be trusted by major nations to meet its contracted obligation, and Contractors handling projects in the region are now fast tracking the repairs of oil and gas infrastructure. This will in turn boost the production level of oil companies. Report from the Government indicate that following the relative peace ushered in by the cease- fire as a result of the amnesty declaration, the country’s oil output rose to 2.3million barrels a day from 800,000 barrels a day between 2006 and 2008. An increment of 1.5million barrels per day indicates 120.45million dollars of revenue to national coffers every day (Igwe, 2010).

From a cursory look, the post amnesty programme via disarmament of the Niger Delta militants yielded considerable outcomes. In terms of favourable outcomes, the spate of violence including kidnappings and killings has been reduced, while the production of oil has increased from 700,000 barrels to 2.3 million barrels per day. To buttress this point, table 4 below

presented oil production in Nigeria between 2008 and 2012 that is, before and after the disarmament programme for the militants.

Table 4: Crude Oil Production in Nigeria, 2008-2012

Year	Production	Change
2008	2,165.44	-7.84%
2009	2,208.31	1.98%
2010	2,455.26	11.18%
2011	2,520.00	2.79%
2012	2,525.29	3.87%

Source: Energy Information Administration, (EIA), www.eia.doe.gov.

Table 4 indicates that oil production in Nigeria significantly increased after the disarmament programme granted to the militants in Niger Delta. Tanimu (2009) observed that gains from the disarmament programme which include rise in the nations crude oil export; is in oil and gas infrastructure to the three tier of government as well as the return of oil companies to the Niger Delta region and repair of oil and gas infrastructure destroyed during the pre-amnesty periods. The success of the amnesty via disarmament programme for the militants spawned immediate results as the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) announced the increase in countries crude production per day (NNPC Report, 2009).

Impact of Militant Insurgency on the Nigerian Economy

The crisis in the Niger Delta region arising from the activities of the different militant groups operating in the region have impacted the Nigerian economy negatively in various ways:

National Loss of Income and Resources: The crisis made Nigeria lose money. The then chairman, Senate Committee on the Niger-Delta and Conflict Resolution claimed that Nigeria lost an estimated \$58.3 billion between 1998 and 2007. The resources that supposed to be used to improve Nigeria are diverted into servicing violence (Nzelu, 2002).

Kidnapping and Hostage Taking: Kidnapping and hostage taking has been a major tactic of the militant groups. Hostage taking of oil workers started in Bayelsa in January, 2006 after the declaration of Operation Orido Danger by MEND. The implication of the kidnappings which involved mainly foreign workers and development partners on Nigeria's economic development has been enormous. It in scared away potential development partners thereby robbed the Nigerian state of the benefit of such development alliances and opportunities.

Illegal Oil Bunkering: The operations of militants in the Niger Delta has made it impossible for security agencies to adequately cover locations of various oil facilities. Illegal oil bunkering which is a euphemism for oil theft, assumed considerable dimensions in the Niger Delta (Oudeman, 2006). Several militant groups are also believed to be involved in illegal oil bunkering

which has become a major source of funding for the operations of the militants in the Niger delta.

Security Challenges: Militancy in the Niger Delta region characterized by unprecedented criminalities, compromised the security situation in Nigerian territorial waters and made it hazardous. The unprecedented escalation of militancy in the region did not only aid insecurity of Niger Delta, but of Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea.

Downsizing of Oil Companies Employees and Disruption of Business Activities: As a result of the activities of militants in the Niger delta region, several workers were retrenched while some companies shut down. This aggravated the unemployment situation. Restiveness also reduced growth in the business sector by radical reduction in the production of oil. Nigeria was drastically affected from production slow down. Some companies stopped operations, to relocate to safer environments (Ejibunu, 2007).

Disruption of Individual Peace: The total peace of the individuals making up the society is the peace of that society. The peace of the society is disturbed as the peace of the individuals is disturbed. According to Olagunju (2002), the peace of the individual in the society is the foundation for social harmony. Human suffering, destruction of livelihood, constant displacement, fear and acute insecurity disturbs the individual's peace. The militancy has really disrupted people economies and multiplying their woes.

Dwindling Foreign Direct Investment: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) got leaner while international oil investors mostly relocated to safer environments, thereby denying the Niger Delta and the federal government of Nigeria the chance for more investments that can provide jobs and boost economy. An inauspicious for Nigeria's production slumped international investment. Foreign direct investment, mostly in the petroleum sector, sank in 2009 (Swartz and Connors, 2010).

Challenges of Amnesty via Disarmament in the Niger Delta

Federal forces undertook amnesty via disarmament processes and the verification and monitoring of faction compliance. The programme was not a problem free as it encounters some hiccups which are enumerated below:

- 1) There is a close correlation between the level of insecurity and distrust among faction groups in the Niger Delta and the quantity and quality of weapons surrendered. Mutual suspicion among faction groups also contributed to non-full compliance with disarmament components amid acrimonious reciprocal accusations of violations during the harvest of weapons.

- 2) **Lack of Adequate Funding:** Disarmament is a cash-for-arms program, whereby the militants were given cash rewards, small-scale business loan and job training schemes to provide alternative possibilities for post-combat activities. The unfortunate case was that, there was inadequate fund to finance the programme and this hinders its success.
- 3) **Lack of Political Will:** Lack of capacity to enforce regulations on the open carrying of weapons, this complement the political, economic and security climate which promote the security and economic value of owning and using a weapon. The security officers in collaboration with the government be empower to enforce rule and regulation for successful disarmament.
- 4) **Lack of Adequate Preparation:** The emergency of the program without adequate preparation hinder the success of the program. The program is rather political in nature than solution driven, this make it to be implemented in without full planning, consultation and involvement.

Conditions for the Successful Disarmament

- A. Sufficient Funding:** There is need for enough money to implement the programme, and to provide for contingencies in a flexible way. The militias depended on their arms for survival, as it was their strength and bargaining power. It is undeniable fact that militias will only willing to relinquish their weapons when there is clear and credible evidence that all agreement would be implemented with the supervision of a credible high profile third party (Coventry Cathedral, 2009).
- B. Security and Inclusion:** Security and inclusion must be integrated into an agreement defining the end of hostilities and the implementation of amnesty. Experience has shown that DDR programs cannot drive a peace process alone, but with the context of a negotiated settlement, a ceasefire, or a peace agreement. Security and a confidence-building measure must be strengthened in the agreement.
- C. Only trust can break the cycle of violence and allowing warring parties to disarm and resume civilian life.** Third parties is needed to play an important role of guaranteeing compliance with a ceasefire and respect for public order.
- D. Safe Environment:** The safety of individuals, and equitable implementation of disarmament program will can only be promoted by a respected third party neutral. A credible deterring force is as well necessary to prevent unilateral violations of agreements.
- E. Acareful coordination of the phases of the amnesty program by the different experts is needed.** A credible and authoritative institution is needed to plan, implement, and oversee the program.

- F. It is necessary that all parties be included in the DDR program and disarmed simultaneously to guide against escalation of the violent conflict.** It is of necessity that all parties develop ownership of the process. External observers and military attachés should also play the role impartiality and neutrality.

Conclusion

The study noted that militancy was a product of years of exploitation of Niger Delta resources and the neglect of their agitation for better life by successive Nigeria government. The character and attitude of the government to the agitation of the region through the use of force to keep the people down could not resolve the crises. The threat to the nation's economic survival and national security were part of the most important reasons for the proclamation of amnesty in the region. The study revealed the existence of a semblance of peace in the Niger Delta in the aftermath of the amnesty programme. The relative peace experienced in the Niger Delta region has major impacts on the Nigerian economy. To this end, the study uncovers that the success of the amnesty in Niger Delta increased crude oil production in Nigeria and led to generation of revenue for development.

Recommendations

In the light of the foregoing findings, the following recommendations for policy implementation were put forward:

- 1) Environmental policies should be mainstream in national economic policies and address destruction of Niger Delta environment by Multi National Oil Companies. This should be enacted into law and monitoring agencies to enforce compliance.
- 2) Eradication of corruption is one of the keys to ensuring sustainable development in the Niger Delta area of Nigeria. Government should establish a credible institution to check the corrupt practices of stakeholders.
- 3) There is need to address the fundamental grievances of the oil-bearing communities. The proclamation of amnesty is a palliative measure that will have no significant effects without tackle the root causes of the conflict. To this effect, there should be rapid development of the Niger Delta region through the provision of infrastructural facilities.
- 4) Nigerian economy should be diversified in order to reduce total dependence on the petroleum sector. The success of the diversification program will reduce the rising incidence of youth restiveness, guarantee national security and create employment opportunities for the teeming population of unemployed youth.

- 5) First impression lasts longer, government must proof their readiness and loyalty to the peace agreement.

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